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Abstract
A central theme in social choice theory is that of impossibility theorems, such as Arrow’s
theorem [Arr63] and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [Gib73, Sat75], which state that
under certain natural constraints, social choice mechanisms are impossible to construct. In
recent years, beginning in Kalai [Kal01], much work has been done in finding robust versions
of these theorems, showing “approximate” impossibility remains even when most, but not
all, of the constraints are satisfied. We study a spectrum of settings between the case where
society chooses a single outcome (a`-la-Gibbard-Satterthwaite) and the choice of a complete
order (as in Arrow’s theorem). We use algebraic techniques, specifically representation
theory of the symmetric group, and also prove robust versions of the theorems that we
state. Our relaxations of the constraints involve relaxing of a version of “independence of
irrelevant alternatives”, rather than relaxing the demand of a transitive outcome, as is done
in most other robustness results.
1 Introduction
Social choice deals with the aggregation of opinions of individuals in a society into a single opin-
ion. There are several important impossibility theorems in the field, stating that aggregation
mechanisms satisfying some natural conditions, are dictatorial (dependent on the opinion of a
single voter).
The first of these theorems is Arrow’s theorem. Let there be a set of n individuals, who
wish to decide on a ranking of m alternatives. Each individual has their own full ranking of the
alternatives. Let Lm be the set of full transitive linear order on [m] and Om be the set of all
anti symmetric relations on [m]. A social welfare function (SWF) is a function f : Lnm → Om,
that maps the individual rankings of the n voters into an aggregated relation.
Definition 1.1: A SWF f is called
• Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), if for every 2 alternatives a, b, the aggregated
preference between a and b depends only on the individual preferences between a and b.
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• Consistent, if it always returns a transitive order (is into Lm).
Theorem 1.2: (Arrow) For m ≥ 3, every function that is consistent and IIA, and agrees with
unanimous votes, is dictatorial.
Another theorem of similar flavor is Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s theorem (GS), known to be
strongly connected to Arrow’s theorem. It deals with a setting in which the voters only wish
to choose one of the m alternatives. A social choice function (SCF) is a function f : Lnm → [m],
that maps the individual rankings of n voters into an aggregated choice. GS deals with the
game-theoretic notion of strategy proofness, where no voter has an incentive to misreport their
true opinion and obtain a better result from her perspective.
For the formal definition of strategy-proofness, we introduce some notations. For a profile
x ∈ Lnm, x = (x1, ..., xn) and a voter i ∈ [n], we will denote x = (x−i, xi), where x−i indicates
the votes of all voters except the i’th. For y ∈ Lm, we will use <y to indicate the corresponding
order. We similarly define >y,≥y,≤y.
Definition 1.3: A SCF f is called strategy-proof, iff
∀i ∈ [n], x−i ∈ Ln−1m , xi, y ∈ Lm, f(x−i, xi) ≥xi f(x−i, y)
i.e. no voter, under any circumstance, has an incentive to misreport their true preference.
Theorem 1.4: (Gibbard-Satterthwaite) for m ≥ 3, a social aggregator f : Lnm → [m] that is
onto and strategy-proof is dictatorial.
The connection between the notions of strategy-proofness and IIA was demonstrated in
[NP07, DL07], and the connection between the proofs of these theorems was demonstrated in,
e.g., [Ren01]. However we are not aware of previous work which presents a single scheme that
unites the different settings (SWF vs. SCF) and the different constraints (IIA vs. strategy-
proofness) .
In the past decade there has been a flurry of work done in providing analytical proofs
of these theorems, and finding robust versions of them - i.e. showing that aggregators that
almost satisfy the constraints (consistency, IIA, strategy-proofness) are close to fitting the
classification (dictatorial). The relaxation of consistency in Arrow’s theorem was initiated in
[Kal01] and culminated in [Mos11], which finally provided a robust version of the unmodified
Arrow’s theorem. See also [Mos09, Kel10b, Kel10a].The same was done for several examples in
the judgment aggregation setting in [Neh10]. See also [Xia08].
Relaxing the strategy-proofness constraint in GS has some important computational impli-
cations. In [FKKN11] such a result was achieved for functions with m = 3, and in [IKM10] for
neutral functions with m > 3. Recently [MR11] provided the final word on this theme, proving
a robust version of the unmodified Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.
Our work continues this line of research. A word or two on the novelty of our approach. The
basic and beautiful idea in Kalai’s paper [Kal01], which was followed in most of the subsequent
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work, was using the IIA condition to translate a SWF to a set of Boolean functions, thus
enabling the application of Fourier analysis on {0, 1}n, a technique that is very useful for
proving robustness results. The robustness referred to the distance between a given SWF to a
function which is consistent, i.e. where the output is always transitive. In the current paper
we chose to insist on the output being of the same form as the input (e.g. being a complete
order in the SWF setting), and measure robustness with respect to the number of violations of
a special set of constraints.
To this end, and in order to allow a spectrum of results between SWF (Arrow) and SCF
(Gibbard-Satterthwaite), we use a notion similar to IIA, called Independence of Rankings (IR)
and show a robust impossibility theorem for it. IR first appeared in [DH10b], where they
characterize impossibility domains for non-binary judgment aggregation and IR is their prime
example.
We complete the analogue to Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s theorem by showing that the impossi-
bility theorem for the IR definition implies an impossibility theorem for some proper definition
of strategy-proofness. This definition is an adaptation of a strategy-proofness definition intro-
duced in [DL07] for binary judgment aggregation.
Our approach leads naturally to representation theory of the symmetric group, which re-
places the Abelian Fourier analysis that arises in the previous analytical works cited above. As
in most applications of spectral techniques to combinatorial problems, this approach includes
two components: The encoding of a combinatorial quantity as a quadratic form, and the ex-
traction of combinatorial information from the spectral analysis of that form. In this work the
algebraic encoding entailed the use of block matrices. The usage of block matrices encompasses
substantial expressive power, as it enables the encoding of every Constraint Satisfaction Prob-
lem for constraints that relate to pairs of input points, on any size of alphabet. The canonical
uses of the spectral method, utilizing standard 0− 1 matrices, are usually limited to a certain
type of constraints on alphabet of size 2, which mainly enables the treatment of notions related
to expansion in graphs. In this paper the spectral analysis involves tensor algebra, allowing us
to take advantage of the block structure of the matrices. This enables the extraction of the
combinatorial information encoded inside the block structure.
2 Structure of the Paper
The paper is organized as Follows:
• In section 3 we define the constraints we are using and state the robust impossibility
theorem.
• In section 4 we provide a bird’s-eye view of the proof.
• In section 5 we recall some essentials of representation theory.
• In section 6 we present the formal structure of the proof, divided into short lemmas,
which are proved in the subsequent section. The section is divided into two subsections,
subsection 6.1 which deals with the case of a single voter, and subsection 6.2, for an
arbitrary number of voters.
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• Section 7 provides the proofs of the lemmas from section 6
• The final robustness result is derived from the conclusions made in section 6 combined
with an extension of a result by Friedgut, Kalai and Naor ([FKN02]). Section 8 provides
the proof of the extension of [FKN02] with the necessary adaptations to our setting.
The main analytic tool this proof uses is a hypercontractive inequality of Beckner and of
Bonami, which is also adapted to our setting in subsection 8.1.
• In section 9, we introduce a strategy-proofness definition and show its connection to IR
and an appropriate impossibility theorem.
3 Results
In this paper we present a robust impossibility theorem in the flavor of Arrow’s and Gibbard-
Satterthwaite’s theorems. The constraint we will use is a variant of IIA. We present a single
proof dealing with functions in a spectrum of ranges, from functions returning a full ranking
(SWFs) to functions returning one alternative (SCFs), including a plethora of ranges in between.
The result can be interpreted as a 2-query dictatorship test with full completeness.
In our setting, we deal with aggregation of rankings of m alternatives. A ranking is a
permutation x ∈ Sm. We will use the convention x(rank) = name.
For presentation sake, we shall begin with the definition of the constraint when used for
functions returning a full ranking (SWFs) and state the corresponding impossibility theorem
without robustness. The more complicated definitions and theorems will follow.
3.1 Main Theorem
Definition 3.1: A social aggregator f : Snm → Sm satisfies Independence of Rankings (IR) iff
the aggregated ranking of the j’th alternative is dependent only on the individual rankings of
the j’th alternative
∀x, y ∈ Snm, j ∈ [m],
(∀i ∈ [n], x−1i (j) = y−1i (j))⇒ f(x)−1(j) = f(y)−1(j)
This constraint requires independence of rankings instead of independence of pairwise pref-
erences required in IIA. This constraint was discussed in [DH10b], in the context of non-binary
judgment aggregation.
As in IIA, this definition compares voting profiles which may differ in any number of votes.
Throughout this paper, we shall use an alternative, equivalent definition, that compares inputs
that differ in a single vote (as is the case in the definition of strategy-proofness):
Definition 3.2: A social aggregator f : Snm → Sm satisfies Independence of Rankings (IR) iff
∀i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], x−i ∈ Sn−1m , xi, yi ∈ Sm, x−1i (j) = y−1i (j)⇒ f(x−i, xi)−1(j) = f(x−i, yi)−1(j)
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It is easy to show that these two definitions are equivalent, via a hybrid argument. The
corresponding impossibility theorem is
Theorem 3.3: For m ≥ 3, a social aggregator f : Snm → Sm that is IR is either a constant
function or dictatorial of the following form: there exists a voter i and a constant permutation
y of the rankings such that f(x) = y ◦ xi.
In [DH10b], a similar impossibility theorem was shown, using purely combinatorial argu-
ments. Their result deals with a larger range of possible formats of input and output, yet
demands further constraints on the function in question. We do not see a way to extend their
techniques to achieve robustness.
3.2 Robust Impossibility Theorem
A robust impossibility theorem means that when the constraint is almost satisfied, then the
function is almost dictatorial.
To the best of our knowledge, most previous robustness results regarding SWF’s focused
on relaxation of the rationality (the transitivity of the outcome), and measure the distance to
a function which is rational. We, instead, demand rationality, and relax (our variant) of IIA.
There is something satisfying about relaxing this specific constraint, rather than others, as it
seems to be slightly less natural than rationality and unanimity.
Definition 3.4: A social aggregator f : Snm → Sm is called ǫ − IR if the rate of constraints
that are not satisfied is smaller than ǫ, i.e.∑
i∈[n],j∈[m]
Prx−i∈Sn−1m ,xi,yi∈Sm
[(
x−1i (j) = y
−1
i (j)
) ∧ (f(x−i, xi)−1(j) 6= f(x−i, yi)−1(j))] ≤ ǫ
Theorem 3.5: For m ≥ 3, a social aggregator f : Snm → Sm that is ǫ-IR is O(m8ǫ)) close to
a function that is either a constant function or dictatorial of the following form: there exists a
voter i and a constant permutation y of the rankings such that f(x) = y ◦ xi.
3.3 A Spectrum of Ranges
As stated earlier, we will also deal with a setting where the aggregated opinion is not a full
ranking, but a partial ranking. Let H ⊆ Sm be a subgroup of Sm. We call it a fixing subgroup
if it consists of all permutations respecting a given partition of the m rankings into 2 or more
parts. An H-social aggregator is a function f : Snm → Sm/H, where Sm/H refers to right cosets
of H (We use this notation even though H is not a normal subgroup). Many types of functions
fall under this scheme. Examples are:
• For H as the trivial group, H-social aggregators are SWFs.
• For H as the group of permutations fixing the element 1, H-social aggregators are SCFs.
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• For H as the group of permutations fixing the set {1, 2, 3}, H-social aggregators are
functions returning triumvirates.
• For H as the group of permutations fixing the sets {1} and {2, 3}, H-social aggregators
are functions returning a president and two vice-presidents.
The definition of IR can be extended to H-social aggregators in the following manner:
Definition 3.6: Let H ⊆ Sm be a fixing subgroup of Sm. For H1 a right coset of H in Sm,
and j ∈ [m] define the j-profile of H1 as the multiset H−11 (j) =
{
y−1(j)|y ∈ H1
}
.
Definition 3.7: Let H ⊆ Sm be a fixing subgroup of Sm. An H-social aggregator f satisfies
Independence of Rankings (IR) iff the aggregated j-profile is dependent only on the individual
rankings of the j’th alternative.
∀i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], x−i ∈ Sn−1m , xi, yi ∈ Sm, x−1i (j) = y−1i (j)⇒ f(x−i, xi)−1(j) = f(x−i, yi)−1(j)
Example 3.8: Let H = Sm,1, the group of permutations that fix the element 1. In that case,
an H social aggregator f is a function that returns a single winner in an election.
When the winner of the election is k, then the function returns the coset Hk, which is the
coset that includes all permutations that assign k to 1. The k-profile of Hk is |H| copies of 1.
The j-profile of Hk for every j 6= k has |H|m−1 copies of each number between 2 and m.
f is IR in that case if, for an alternative j, when given the individual rankings of j by all
voters in a voting profile x, we are able to determine whether j is the winner of the election
(i.e., the j-profile of f(x) is |H| copies of 1) or not (i.e. the j-profile of f(x) has |H|m−1 copies of
each number between 2 and m).

We shall leave the exact definition of an ǫ-IR H-social aggregator to a later part of the paper,
see definition 6.4. The impossibility theorems also extend to H-social aggregators.
Theorem 3.9: Let H ⊆ Sm be a fixing subgroup of Sm. For m ≥ 3, an H-social aggregator f
that is IR is either a constant function or dictatorial of the following form: there exists a voter
i and a constant permutation y of the rankings such that f(x) = Hy ◦ xi.
Theorem 3.10: Let H ⊆ Sm be a fixing subgroup of Sm. For m ≥ 3, an H-social aggregator f
that is ǫ-IR is OH(poly(m)ǫ) close to a function that is either a constant function or dictatorial
of the following form: there exists a voter i and a constant permutation y of the rankings such
that f(x) = y ◦ xi.
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4 Structure of the proof
We give here a short exposition of the proof. For simplicity, we shall refer here to the basic form
of the Main theorem (theorem 3.3), where the function is a SWF. To simplify the notation, we
shall also use in this section definition 3.1 for IR, instead of 3.2, which is the definition we shall
use in the rest of the paper.
We shall treat this problem as a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP). We shall use the
definition
Find all functions f : Snm → Sm s.t.
IR: j ∈ [m], x, y ∈ Snm,
x−1(j) = y−1(j)⇒ (f(x))−1(j) = (f(y))−1(j)
A CSP has a generic algebraic encoding. The function f can be encoded as a function returning
a vector in RSm , which is the characteristic vector of the singleton {f(x)}. This encoding can
be interpreted as a tensor F ∈ RSnm×Sm, with 2 indices x, v ∈ Sm
Fx,v = 1v=f(x).
The constraints can be algebraically encoded using a matrix that represents their truth table,
or, in our case, since we want to count the number of violated constraints, the truth table of
their negation. We use a matrix of matrices. For every two inputs x, y ∈ Snm, the (x, y)’th entry
of the matrix will be a matrix in RSm×Sm . This matrix will be the truth table of the negation
of the constraints concerning x, y and j. This encoding can also be interpreted as a tensor:((
Lj
)
xy
)
vxvy
= 1[x−1(j)=y−1(j)]∧[v−1x (j)6=v−1y (j)]
where j ∈ [m], x, y ∈ Snm and vx, vy ∈ Sm.
We can use these tensors in a quadratic form to count the number if unsatisfied constraints.
Since L is the truth table of the negation of the constraints, the quadratic form∑
j
FLjF t
counts the number of violated constraints.
The CSP under this encoding takes the form
Find all F ∈ RSnm×Sm s.t.
Consistency: ∀x ∈ Snm, Ffx∗ is a characteristic vector of a singleton
IR:
∑
j FL
jF = 0
The proof unfolds as follows:
• We show that L  0 (PSD), i.e. ∑j FLjF t ≥ 0 for every F . Therefore, the functions
that satisfy IR are precisely the kernel of L.
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• Explicitly find the kernel of L, using diagonalization.
• Show that all consistent functions in the kernel of L are dictatorships.
As for the robustness, we will show that functions that are ǫ-IR are L2 close to the kernel of L.
We shall generalize the result of [FKN02] to prove that such functions, that are also consistent,
are L2 close to dictatorships.
For an H social aggregator, we shall encode f to return characteristic vectors of cosets of H,
normalized so that their L1 norm equals 1. We shall call such vectors H coset vectors. As a
tensor F , this encoding takes the form:
Fx,v =
1
|H|1v∈f(x)
A very convenient feature of our definitions and approach is that the introduction of H social
aggregators does not insert any new elements to the proof. Essentially, the same Laplacian L
encodes the notions of IR and ǫ-IR for H social aggregators, and only the consistency constraint
changes. The algebraic CSP for H social aggregators is
Find all F ∈ RSnm×Sm s.t.
Consistency: ∀x ∈ Snm, Fx∗ is an H-coset vector
IR:
∑
j FL
jF t = 0
5 Representation Theory
In this section we recall some basic notions of representation theory that are necessary for our
proof.
A representation is a Homomorphism ρ from a group G to GLd(C), the group of com-
plex d-dimensional square matrices. d is called the dimension of the representation d(ρ). A
representation is called irreducible if it is not similar to a direct sum of 2 representations.
For a finite group, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the conjugacy classes of
the group and irreducible representations (up to similarity). We shall denote the number of
conjugacy classes of G as [G]. For a conjugacy class k ∈ [[G]], its corresponding irreducible rep-
resentation will be denoted as ρk. We will sometimes consider ρk as a function, and sometimes
treat it as a vector with |G| entries all of which are d(ρk)× d(ρk) matrices.
In this paper we will deal exclusively with the symmetric group or direct products of the
symmetric group. It is well known that in the symmetric group one can choose a basis for
which all irreducible representations (also known as irreps) have real, unitary matrices as values.
Henceforth we will assume we are dealing with such a basis.
The defining representation of the symmetric group Sm is the permutation representation
P of dimension m.
P (x)ij = 1x(i)=j
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It is well known that P = ρ0⊕ρ1, i.e. it is the direct sum of two irreducible representations: the
trivial one, which we denote by ρ0, and the (n− 1)-dimensional ρ1. Specifically, if one chooses
a basis for which ρ0, ρ1 are real and unitary then there exists an orthonormal m×m matrix U
such that
P (x) = U
(
ρ0(x)⊕ ρ1(x))U t (1)
where here the ⊕ refers to a matrix composed of blocks.
The all ones vector spans the one dimensional eigenspace of Rm corresponding to the trivial
representation component of P , hence U can be written in the following form (where C is a
m× (m− 1) matrix, and the Ci’s are its rows)
U =

1√
m
...
1√
m
C
 =

1√
m
C1
...
...
1√
m
Cm
 (2)
The character of a representation ρ, denoted by χρ, is the trace of the representation:
χρ(x) = tr(ρ(x)). It is easy to see the the character of similar representations ρ and UρU
−1
are the same.
A final tool we wish to recall is Schur’s orthogonality, which states that the vectors of the
form ρkij are orthogonal, (but not necessarily orthonormal)∑
x
ρk1(x)i1j1ρ
k2(x)i2j2 = δk1k2δi1i2δj1j2
m!
d(ρ?k1)
For a finite group G, these vectors form a complete orthogonal basis for the set of functions
from G to C.
Schur’s orthogonality implies that the characters of irreducible representations are orthonor-
mal: < χρk , χρl >= δk,l. This implies that for a representation τ and an irreducible representa-
tion ρ, < χτ , χρ > is the multiplicity of ρ in the decomposition of τ to irreducible representations.
A complete set of irreducible representations for Gn is the set of tensors of the irreps of G:
{ρr¯ =
n⊗
i=1
ρri}r¯∈[[G]]n
5.1 Fourier transform and diagonalization
For a finite group G, given a function f : G→ C, its Fourier transform at a representation ρ is
f̂(ρ) = Ex∈Gf(x)ρ(x).
We shall sometimes use the abbreviated notation f̂(k) = f̂(ρk)
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For such a function f , define a matrix M ∈ CG×G whose values are Mx,y = f(x−1y), then
M can be partially diagonalized (decomposed into eigenspaces) using representation theory. In
a partial diagonalization, an eigenspace does not have a corresponding eigenvalue, but rather a
corresponding eigenblock. Given a chosen set of basis vectors {vi}i for an eigenspace of a matrix
A, the (i, j)’th entry of the corresponding eigenblock is viAv
t
j .
In the case of M , each irrep ρk defines an eigenspace spanned by the aforementioned or-
thogonal vectors (ρi,j(x))x∈G. The eigenblock corresponding to ρ
k is Id(ρk) ⊗ f̂(k).
Another formulation of this is: M is a |G| × |G| matrix, whose entries are given by
Mx,y =
∑
k∈[[G]]
d(ρk)tr
((
ρ¯kf̂(k)ρ¯k
t
)
x,y
)
Where ρ¯k is a column vector of size |G| whose x’th entry is the matrix ρk(x). The multiplication
f̂(k)ρ¯k
t
means multiplying the entries of ρ¯k
t
by f̂(k), hence ρ¯kf̂(k)ρ¯k
t
is a |G| dimensional
matrix whose entries are d(ρk) dimensional matrices.
For a function g, gM is known as the convolution of g and f and is denoted as g ∗ f . The
partial diagonalization discussed above shows that:
ĝ ∗ f(k) = ĝ(k)f̂(k)
(gMgt)x,y =
∑
k∈[[G]]
d(ρk)tr
((
ĝ(k)f̂(k)ĝt(k)
)
x,y
)
If f is a characteristic function of a set T of generators of G, thenM is the adjacency matrix
of the Cayley graph Γ(G,T ). For convenience, we shall call such a graph a Cayley graph even
when f is a characteristic function of any subset T of G, as the property of T generating G is
irrelevant for our uses.
6 The Proof
In this section we present a more detailed version of the proof, divided into lemmas. The actual
proofs of the lemmas will appear in section 7.
6.1 One Voter Functions
We begin our analysis by treating the case of a single voter, since this contains the analytical
seed from which the multi-voter case grows. The combinatorial problem for a single voter is not
very difficult, although if one is interested in a robustness theorem it seems that straightforward
elementary techniques are insufficient.
In order to treat a social welfare functions on one voter f : Sm → Sm, we construct in
this section a quadratic form encoding the constraints, and, as mentioned in section 4, we will
diagonalize it.
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For f : Sm → Sm, denote by IR(f) the rate of unsatisfied constraints
IR(f) =
∑
j∈[m]
Prx,y∈Sm [
(
x−1(j) = y−1(j)
) ∧ (f(x)−1(j) 6= f(y)−1(j))].
Let Xj be the matrix X ∈ RSm×Sm ,
Xjxy = 1x−1(j)=y−1(j) = 1x−1y(j)=j .
Let X¯j be its complement X¯jxy = 1 − Xjxy. We will use the vector encoding described in 4,
Fx,v = 1v=f(x) (or the corresponding definition for H-social aggregators).
The following lemma describes a quadratic form in the values of f that equals IR(f):
Lemma 6.1: Let f be a social aggregator and F its encoding as described above. Let L′j =
Xj ⊗ X¯j , and L′ =∑j L′j , then
IR(f) =
1
|Sm|2FL
′F t
Xj is the adjacency matrix of the Cayley graph Γ(Sm,Sm,j), where Sm,j is the subgroup of
Sm of permutations fixing j. A quadratic form based on the Laplacian of that same graph is
more suitable for our purposes, because it is PSD. The Laplacian of that graph, Y , is given by
Y j = (m− 1)!I −Xj
The corresponding quadratic form is given in the following lemma. The quadratic forms given
in lemmas 6.1 and 6.2 are equivalent when F represents a consistent function.
Lemma 6.2: Let f be a social aggregator and F its encoding as described above. Let L′′j =
Y j ⊗Xj , , and L′′ =∑j L′′j , then
IR(f) =
1
|Sm|2FL
′′F t
Since X the adjacency matrix of a Cayley graph, it can be partially diagonalized via the
representations of the symmetric group, as explained in subsection 5.1. As will be shown in the
proof of the following lemma, all the information relevant to the computation of IR(f) lies in
X’s ρ1 component. This leads to a simplified quadratic form, used with a different encoding
for f . Let g : S1m → R(m−1)×(m−1) be a an encoding of f such that g(x) = ρ1(f(x)). A vector
form of g is a vector G whose each entry is a m− 1×m− 1 matrix Gx = g(x). (For H social
aggregators, g(x) = Ey∈f(x)ρ1(y)).
The corresponding quadratic form is as follows.
Lemma 6.3: Let f be a social aggregator and G its encoding as described above. Let Lj =
Y j ⊗Dj, where Dj = CtjCj (See 2), and L =
∑
j L
j , then
IR(f) =
1
|Sm|2 tr(GLG
t) (3)
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For an H social aggregator, IR(f) is defined as such: it averages, for pairs of inputs that
agree on the ranking of j, the square of the ℓ2 distance of the characteristic vector of the j-profile
of the outputs.
Definition 6.4: For an H-social aggregator f : Snm → Sm/H, define IR(f) to be
IR(f) =
∑
i,j
Ex−i,xi,yi
(
1x−1i (j)=y
−1
i (j)
∥∥∥∥nf(x−i,xi)−1(j) − nf(x−i,yi)−1(j)|H|
∥∥∥∥2
2
)
Where for a multiset S, nS is its characteristic vector, i.e., for an element x, nS at the index x
equals the number of occurrences of x in S.
In the following we claim that the quadratic form we have defined in 6.3 indeed equals the
value IR(f), as defined in definition 6.4. As usual, we only address the 1 voter case in this
subsection:
Claim 6.5: Let H ⊆ Sm be a fixing subgroup of Sm. Let f be an H-social aggregator over 1
voter, and G be its encoding as defined above, then
IR(f) =
1
|Sm|2 tr(GLG
t)
We partially diagonalize L in the following lemma, decomposing it to eigenspaces. For the
purposes of this lemma, we shall define the operator t˜r that operates on block matrices. The
operator returns a matrix whose (x, y)’th entry is the trace of (x, y)’th block in the original
matrix: t˜r(M)xy = tr(Mxy).
Lemma 6.6:
L =
∑
r∈[[Sm]]
d(ρr)t˜r
(
(ρr ⊗ I) L̂(r) (ρr ⊗ I)t
)
where
L̂(0) = I · 0 , L̂(r > 1) = I ⊗ I · 1
m
L̂(1) =
1
m− 1
m− 1
m
I ⊗ I −
∑
j
Dj ⊗Dj

The diagonalization of L̂(1) is given by:
Lemma 6.7: L̂(1) has 3 orthogonal eigenspaces whose dimensions are 1,m− 1, (m− 1)2 −m.
Denote their corresponding basis matrices as U0, U1, U2. The corresponding eigenvalues are
0, 1m(m−1) ,
1
m . The eigenvectors are vectors in R
(m−1)·(m−1). When read as a (m− 1)× (m− 1)
matrix, U0 is the identity matrix.
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This diagonalization proves that L is PSD and hence, in light of Lemma 6.3, determines
that its kernel is the space of IR functions. This is summarized in this corollary:
Corollary 6.8: Let f : Sm → Sm/H be an IR function, and let g : Sm → Rm−1×m−1 be
defined by g(x) = ρ1(f(x)) then there exist vectors a and b in R(m−1)·(m−1), that can be read as
(m− 1)× (m− 1) matrices A and B) such that
gx = bρ
0(x) + t˜r
(
(aU t0)(I ⊗ ρ1(x)
)
= B +Aρ1(x)
To complete the characterization of 1-voter IR functions, we present the following claim and
lemma. We shall not prove the lemma as it is a consequence of the n voter case.
Claim 6.9: Let H be a subgroup of Sm, and let f be an H-social aggregator and g be g(x) =
ρ1(f(x)), then
∀x, g(x)gt(x) =M
When H is a fixing subgroup, then M 6= 0.
Lemma 6.10: Let g : Sm → Rm−1×m−1 be a function of the form g(x) = B + Aρ1(x) that
satisfies the constraint ∀x, g(x)gt(x) =M for some constant matrix M 6= 0. Then either B = 0
or A = 0.
6.2 Many Voter Functions
The quadratic form capturing the notion of IR(f) for functions on n voters is constructed using
the quadratic form for 1 voter, in the following lemma.
Lemma 6.11: Let H be a fixing subgroup of Sm. For a function f : S
n
m → Sm/H, let G be as
before, the encoding of f in terms of its ρ1 component:
G(x) = ρ1(f(x)) = Ey∈f(x)ρ1(y),
where the expectation with respect to y refers to the case of H-social-aggregators. Let
Ln,j,i = I⊗i−1 ⊗ Y j ⊗ I⊗n−i ⊗Dj , Ln,i =
∑
j
Ln,j,i Ln =
∑
i
Ln,i
Then the number of unsatisfied constraints is
IR(f) =
1
|Sm|n+1 tr(GL
nGt)
We can diagonalize Ln based on our diagonalization of L:
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Corollary 6.12: The diagonalization of Ln is given by:
Ln,i =
1
|Sm|n−1
∑
r¯∈[[Sm]]n
d(ρr¯)t˜r
(
(ρr¯ ⊗ I)L̂n,i(r¯)(ρr¯ ⊗ I)t
)
The L̂n,i’s are derived from the 1 voter L̂’s, as follows.(
L̂n,i(ρr¯)
)
k1...knkl1...lnl
=
∏
t∈[n],t6=i
(
Id(ρrt )
)
ktlt
·
(
L̂(ρri)
)
kiklil
The L̂n coefficients are matrices which are not necessarily diagonal. The following lemma
partly characterizes their diagonalization, in a manner that suffices for our needs.
Lemma 6.13:
1. If there exists any coordinate i ∈ [n] for which ri > 1 then L̂n(r¯)  1mI (A  B means
that A−B is PSD).
2. Otherwise, if there exist at least 2 coordinates i ∈ [n] for which ri = 1 then L̂n(r¯) 
O
(
1
m2
)
I
3. Otherwise, if there exists exactly 1 coordinate i ∈ [n] for which ri = 1 then L̂n(r¯) = L̂(1).
As shown in lemma 6.7, it has a 0 eigenvalue corresponding to the eigenvector U0 and a
smallest nonzero eigenvalue of O
(
1
m2
)
.
4. Otherwise, r¯ is all zeros, and L̂n(r¯) = 0.
For a PSD matrix, its spectral gap is its smallest non-zero eigenvalue. We conclude the
following from the diagonalization of Ln:
Corollary 6.14:
• The kernel of Ln, which is the set of all IR functions, consists exclusively of functions of
the form g(x1, ..., xn) = B +
∑n
i=1A
i · ρ1(xi)
• The spectral gap of 1|Sm|Ln is 1O(m2) .
To finish the proof of theorem 3.3, we need to show that the intersection of the kernel
of Ln with the consistency constraint, includes only dictatorships. We don’t need to use the
consistency constraint to its full capacity. All we need to use is the quadratic constraint that
∀x, g(x)gt(x) =M , whereM is some constant matrix. In the proofs section, we shall show that
this constraint is valid for any H. For instance, if f is a SWF (H is the trivial group), then
since ρ1 is unitary, ∀x, g(x)gt(x) = I.
Corollary 6.15: IR functions which are consistent are dictatorships.
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6.3 Robustness
By using the quadratic form, we are able to connect the combinatorial notion of IR(f) to the
analytical notion of the distance between f and the kernel of Ln. This connection depends on
the spectral gap of L:
Corollary 6.16: If IR(f) ≤ ǫ, and g is the encoding of f as above, then there exists a function
h in the kernel of Ln such that ‖h− g‖22 ≡ Ex∈Snm‖h(x)− g(x)‖22 ≤ O(m2)ǫ
In corollary 6.15 we characterized IR functions, using the fact that the function satisfies
two constraints:
• Being IR, which a linear constraint, because it is equivalent to being in the kernel of L.
• Being consistent, which a quadratic constraint.
It is clear that the intersection of a linear and a quadratic constraint can contain only a few
points. Indeed, we showed that consistent functions which satisfy the linear constraint are
dictatorial.
For ǫ-IR functions, corollary 6.16 shows that the first (linear) constraint is relaxed to being
L2 close to the linear constraint. We wish to show that consistent functions that are L2 close
to the linear constraint are L2 close to being dictatorial.
In [FKN02] a similar result was shown for Boolean functions on Boolean variables. It was
shown that Boolean functions that are linear are dictatorial, and that Boolean functions that
are L2 close to being linear are L2 close to a dictatorial function. Being Boolean is, naturally,
a quadratic constraint. We adapt this theorem to our setting. From it we deduce our main
theorem.
7 Proofs for section 6
7.1 Proofs of the Lemmas for 1 voter functions
Proof of lemma 6.1: This is the straightforward definition of the anti-constraints.
1
|Sm|2
∑
jxvxyvy
FxvxL
′
xvxyvyFyvy =
1
|Sm|2
∑
jxvxyvy
FxvxX
j
xyX¯
j
vxvyFyvy =
1
|Sm|2
∑
jxvxyvy
1vx=f(x)1x−1(j)=y−1(j)1v−1x (j)6=v−1y (j)1vx=f(x) =∑
j
Exy1x−1(j)=y−1(j)1f(x)−1(j)6=f(y)−1(j)

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Proof of Lemma 6.2:
Recall
L′′ =
∑
j X
j ⊗ (J −Xj) = ∑j Xj ⊗ J − Xj ⊗Xj
L′ =
∑
j
(
(m− 1)!I −Xj) ⊗ Xj = ∑j (m− 1)!I ⊗Xj − Xj ⊗Xj
Therefore, we need to show that
F
∑
j
Xj · J
F t = F
∑
j
(m− 1)!I ⊗Xj
F t (4)
when F is consistent.
Since F is consistent, ∀x,∑v Fxv = 1, so the left hand side of (4) is∑
jxyvxvy
Fxvx
(
Xjxy · 1
)
Fyvy =
∑
jxy
Xjxy = m ·m! · (m− 1)! = m!2
Since the diagonal of Xj , for every j, is all ones, the right hand side of (4) is∑
jxyvxvy
Fxvx
(
(m− 1)!δxy ⊗Xjvxvy
)
Fyvy =
∑
jxvxvy
Fxvx
(
(m− 1)!Xjvxvy
)
Fxvy =
∑
jx
(
(m− 1)!Xjf(x)f(x)
)
=
∑
jx
((m− 1)!1) = m ·m! · (m− 1)! = m!2

Before we carry on, this is good place to recall U and C from equation 2. The orthonormality
of U implies the following:
Claim 7.1:
CCt = I − J
m
CtC = I
1C = 0
Proof of Lemma 6.3: We will need two simple claims and their corollary.
Claim:
Xjxy =
(
U
(
ρ0(xy−1)⊕ ρ1(xy−1))U t)
jj
Proof: Recall P , the defining representation of Sm. A permutation x has a fixed point j iff
(Px)jj is 1. Therefore,
Xjxy = (Px−1y)jj
Recall that Px = U(ρ
0 ⊕ ρ1)U t, and that U is orthonormal. Therefore
Xjxy = (Pxy−1)jj =
(
U
(
ρ0(xy−1)⊕ ρ1(xy−1))U t)
jj
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Claim:
Xjxy =
(
1ρ0(xy−1)1t
m
+ Cρ1(xy−1)Ct
)
jj
(5)
Proof: Follows from the expansion of U .

Next denote Xj = Xj,0 + Xj,1, where Xj,0xy =
(
1ρ0(xy−1)1t
m
)
jj
and Xj,1xy =
(
Cρ1(xy−1)Ct
)
jj
.
Likewise, denote Lj = Lj,0 + Lj, 1 where Lj,0 = Y j ⊗Xj,0 and Lj,1 = Y j ⊗ xj,1.
Corollary:
IR(f) = FL′F t =
∑
j
(
FLj,0F t + FLj,1F t
)
=
∑
j
FLj,1F t
Proof: The first equalities follow from the expansion of IR(f) and L′. We now show that
FLj,0F t = 0.
FLj,0F t =
∑
xyvxvy
1
|Sm|2Fxvx
Y jxy ·
(
1ρ0(vx)ρ
0(v−1y )1t
m
)
jj
Fyvy
Since F is consistent, and ρ0x = 1x, we have
∑
vx
Fxvxρ
0(vx) = 1x. Therefore
FLj,0F t =
∑
xy
1
|Sm|21x
(
Y jxy
1j1j
m
)
1y = 0

It follows that
IR(f) =
∑
j
FLj,1F t =
∑
jxyvxvy
1
|Sm|2Fxvx
(
Y jxy
(
Cρ1(vx)ρ
1(v−1y )C
t
)
jj
)
Fyvy
In light of the above we can define G, a vector whose entries are (m− 1) dimensional matrices,
as Gx =
∑
v Fxvρ
1(v), and the quadratic form becomes
IR(f) =
∑
jxyklxly
1
|Sm|2 (Gx)klx
(
Y jxyCjlxCjly
)
(Gy)kly =
∑
j
1
|Sm|2 tr
(
G
(
Y j ⊗Dj)Gt)
This completes the Proof of Lemma 6.3.

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Proof of claim 6.5: Recall definition 6.4:
IR(f) =
∑
j
Ex,y
(
1x−1(j)=y−1(j)
∥∥∥∥nf(x)−1(j) − nf(y)−1(j)|H|
∥∥∥∥2
2
)
We will show the equivalency via two simple claims:
Claim a:
1
|Sm|2 tr(GLG
t) =
∑
j
Ex,y
(
1x−1(j)=y−1(j)‖Cjgt(x)− Cjgt(y)‖22
)
Claim b: ∥∥∥∥nf(x)−1(j) − nf(y)−1(j)|H|
∥∥∥∥2
2
= ‖Cjgt(x)− Cjgt(y)‖22
Proof of Claim a: Quadratic forms based on matrices which are Laplacians of graphs, such as
Y j, naturally differentiate values across edges of the graph. This can be seen via the following
simple decomposition of Y j : Define the matrix Zj,x,y to be the Laplacian of the graph whose
vertices are the elements of Sm and is either the empty graph or contains a single edge connecting
x with y in case x−1(j) = y−1(j).
Clearly, Y j =
∑
(x,y)∈(Sm2 )
Zj,x,y. It is also easy to see that the diagonalization of the Z’s
is given by Zj,x,y = 1xy−1(j)=jd
x,ytdx,y where dx,y is a vector that has 1 in x, −1 in y and 0
otherwise.
Using this, we get
tr
(
GLjGt
)
=
∑
(x,y)∈(Sm2 )
tr
(
G
(
Zj,x,y ⊗Dj)Gt) =
∑
(x,y)∈(Sm2 )
1xy−1(j)=jtr
(
G
(
dx,yt ⊗Cjt
)
· (dx,y ⊗ Cj)Gt) =
∑
(x,y)∈(Sm2 )
1xy−1(j)=jtr
(
(g(x) − g(y))Cjt · Cj (g(x) − g(y))t
)
=
∑
(x,y)∈(Sm2 )
1xy−1(j)=j
〈
Cj (g(x) − g(y))t , Cj (g(x)− g(y))t〉

Proof of claim b: Clearly, the normalized characteristic vector of the j-profile of g(x) is
1
|H|nf(x)−1(j) = ej
(
Ey∈g(x)P ty
)
, where ej is the j’th unit vector. When transforming this vector
using the orthonormal matrix U , we get:
1
|H|nf(x)−1(j)U =
(
ejEy∈g(x)P ty
)
U =
(
ejU
(
1⊕ gt(x))U t)U = ejU (1⊕ gt(x)) =
18
(
1√
m
Cj
)(
1⊕ gt(x)) = ( 1√
m
Cjgt(x)
)
Therefore, since U is orthonormal,∥∥∥∥nf(x)−1(j) − nf(y)−1(j)|H|
∥∥∥∥2
2
=
∥∥∥∥nf(x)−1(j) − nf(y)−1(j)|H| U
∥∥∥∥2
2
=
∥∥∥∥( 1√m Cjgt(x)
)
−
(
1√
m
Cjgt(y)
)∥∥∥∥2
2
= ‖Cjgt(x)− Cjgt(y)‖22

Proof of lemma 6.6: Recall that
L =
∑
j
(
(m− 1)!I −Xj)⊗Dj
The identity matrix can be decomposed using the irreps of Sm and Schur orthogonality.
(m− 1)!Ixy = (m− 1)!
m!
 ∑
r∈[[Sm]]
d(ρr)ρr(x)ρr(y−1)

Recall the decomposition of Xj from (5):
Xjxy =
ρ0(x)ρ0(y−1)
m
+ Cjρ
1(x)ρ1(y−1)Ctj
Summing these decompositions, and using the fact that
∑
jD
j =
∑
j C
t
jCj = C
tC = I
yields that for a fixed pair x, y, one has
Lxy = ρ
0(x)⊗ I · 1mI − 1mI · ρ0(y−1)⊗ I +
(m− 1)t˜r( ρ1(x)⊗ I · 1m−1
(
m−1
m I ⊗ I −
∑
jD
j ⊗Dj
)
· ρ1(y−1)⊗ I )+∑|[Sm]|
k>1 d(ρ
k)t˜r( ρk(x)⊗ I · 1mI ⊗
(∑
j C
t
jCj
)
· ρk(y−1)⊗ I )
= ρ0(x)⊗ I · 0 · ρ0(y−1)⊗ I +
(m− 1)t˜r( ρ1(x)⊗ I · 1m−1
(
m−1
m I ⊗ I −
∑
jD
j ⊗Dj
)
· ρ1(y−1)⊗ I )+∑|[Sm]|
k>1 d(ρ
k)t˜r( ρk(x)⊗ I · 1mI ⊗ I · ρk(y−1)⊗ I )
as required.

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Proof of lemma 6.7: Denote by E, a m× (m− 1)2 matrix whose j’s row is Cj ⊗Cj. We
need to diagonalize∑
j
Dj ⊗Dj =
∑
j
(
CtjCj
)⊗ (CtjCj) =∑
j
(
Ctj ⊗Ctj
)
(Cj ⊗ Cj) = EtE
The nonzero eigenvalues of EtE are the nonzero eigenvalues of EEt (this can be deduced from
the SVD decomposition of E). Recall CCt = I − Jm . Therefore,(
EEt
)
ij
= (Ci ⊗ Ci)
(
Ctj ⊗ Ctj
)
=
(
CiC
t
j
)2
=
(
CCt
)2
ij
=(
δij − 1
m
)2
=
(
1− 2
m
)
δij +
(
1
m
)2
Therefore, EEt = m−2m I +
J
m2
, and its eigenvalues are m−1m with multiplicity 1 and
m−2
m with
multiplicity m− 1.
We can verify that the eigenvector of EtE corresponding to the m−1m eigenvalue is U0, which
is the identity matrix parsed as a vector. We need to use two simple facts:
• For 3 matrices A,B and C, the term A · B · Ct when parsed as a vector, is equal to the
term (A⊗ C) · B, when B is parsed as a vector.
• For a matrix C whose rows are {Cj}j , the term
∑
j Cj⊗Cj equals to the term CtC parsed
as a row vector. This is because CtC =
∑
j C
t
jCj.
Therefore, we get that
(E · U0)j = (Cj ⊗ Cj)U0 = CjICtj = CjCtj =
(
CCt
)
jj
=
(
I − J
m
)
jj
=
m− 1
m
Which means that EU0 = 1
m−1
m and
(
EtE
)
U0 = E
t1 · m− 1
m
=
m− 1
m
∑
j
Cj ⊗ Cj
t
Since
∑
j Cj ⊗ Cj is CtC parsed as a vector and CtC = I and U0 is I parsed as a vector, we
get that
(
EtE
)
U0 =
m−1
m U0.

Proof of corollary 6.8: We have shown that eigenspaces of L with eigenvalue 0 are ρ0 and
ρ1U0. All the other eigenvalues are positive, so L is PSD, and IR functions are in the kernel of
L.
Therefore, if G is an IR function:
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1. Its ρ0 Fourier coefficient can be anything.
2. Its ρ1 Fourier coefficient must be of the form A
(
U0
)t
for some vector A. Recall that this
Fourier coefficient has 4 indices, and that U0 is the identity matrix, parsed as a vector,
and also A is some matrix parsed as a vector.
3. All of its other Fourier coefficients must be 0
Explicitly,
g(x)kl = Bklρ
0(x) +
∑
ts
ρ1ts(x)δslAkt = Bkl +
∑
t
Aktρ
1
tl(x)
This means that the function g is g(x) = B + A · ρ1(x) (where A and B are parsed as (m −
1) × (m − 1) matrices), so g is a linear function in ρ1(x), and, according to lemma 6.10, since
g is consistent, either A or B are 0.

Proof of claim 6.9: Let MH be MH = Ex∈Hρ1(x). Since g is consistent, it must be of the
form ∀x,∃y, g(x) =MHρ1(y). Therefore,
g(x)g(x)t =MHρ
1(y)ρ1(y)tM tH =MHM
t
H = Ex∈Hρ
1(x)Ey∈Hρ1(y−1) =
Ex,y∈Hρ1(xy−1) = Ez∈Hρ1(z) =MH
.
We now turn to show that MH 6= 0 when H is fixing. Denote PH = Ex∈HP (x). Clearly
PH = U(1 ⊕MH)U t. Therefore, if MH = 0, then PH ≃ J . However, let i and j be 2 indices
from 2 different parts of the partition that H fixes, then clearly (PH)ii 6= (PH)ij , because for
every x ∈ H, Pij(x) = 0, and for some x ∈ H, Pii(x) = 1.

Remark 7.2: Notice that when H is not a fixing subgroup, it might be the case that MH = 0,
and then g ≡ 0, and every consistent H social aggregator satisfies IR. This is the case, for
instance, when H is the group of even permutations.

7.2 Proofs of Lemmas for many voter functions
Proof of lemma 6.11: We show that applying the n voter quadratic form is similar to applying
the 1 voter quadratic form but over pairs of inputs that differ in only one voter:
GLn,iGt =
∑
x,y
G(x)
(
I⊗i−1 ⊗ Y j ⊗ I⊗n−i ⊗Dj)Gt(y) =
21
∑
x,y
G(x)
(
i−1∏
t=1
Ixt,yt ⊗ Y j
n∏
t=i+1
Ixt,yt ⊗Dj
)
G(y−1) =
∑
x−i,xi,yi
G(x−i, xi, yi)
(
Y j ⊗Dj)Gt(x−i, yi)
From here, the proof follows exactly in the path of the proof of claim 6.5.

Proof of lemma 6.13:
1. Let i be such that ri > 1, then, by corollary 6.12
L̂n,i(r¯) =
1
m
n⊗
k=1
Id(rk) ⊗ Im−1
Since L̂n(r¯) =
∑
j L̂
n,j(r¯) and for every j, r¯, L̂n,j(r¯)  0, we have
L̂n(r¯) = L̂n,i(r¯) +
∑
j 6=i
L̂n,j(r¯)  L̂n,i(r¯)
2. We shall focus only on the case where there are exactly 2 distinct i and j such that
ri = rj = 1, as this case produces the minimal eigenvalue. Indeed, assume that there are
k > 2 such indices i1, i2, ...ik for which rij = 1, and denote r
′ to be 1 in i1 and i2 and 0
otherwise, then L̂n,i1(r) + L̂n,i2(r) = L̂n(r′) ⊗ Im−1. Since the rest of the terms L̂n,ik(r)
are PSD, The minimal eigenvalue of L̂n is at least as large as the minimal eigenvalue of
L̂n(r′).
Recall the diagonalization of L̂(1) (from lemma 6.7)
L̂(1)  1
m(m− 1)
(
I ⊗ I − 1
m− 1U
0U0
t
)
From this, it is easy to deduce the following:
L̂n(r¯) = L̂n,i(r¯) + L̂n,j(r¯)  1
m(m− 1)
(
2I ⊗ I ⊗ I − 1
m− 1
(
AiAi
t
+AjAj
t
))
(6)
Where Ai is a (m − 1)3 × (m − 1) matrix of the form A(pqs)t = δpqδst (p, q, s and t are
indices going from 1 to m− 1. (pqs) forms the row index of Ai and t is its column index).
Likewise, Aj is a (m− 1)3× (m− 1) matrix of the form A(pqs)t = δpsδqt. Denote the right
hand side of (6) as Q.
Denote B = Ai + Aj and C = Ai − Aj. It is easy to see that AiAit + AjAj t =
1
2
(
BBt + CCt
)
. The following are easy to verify:
• BtC = CtB = 0
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• BBt = 2m · I
• CCt = (2m− 4) · I
Therefore, we may deduce that the columns of B and the columns of C are orthogonal
eigenvectors of AiAi
t
+AjAj
t
with eigenvalues m and m− 2, respectively. Plugging this
into the expression for Q, we get that the minimal eigenvalue of Q, corresponding to the
columns of B, is 1m(m−1) (2− mm−1 ) = m−2m(m−1)2 .
Important Note: Notice that if m = 2, Q has eigenvalues equal to 0, and therefore we
cannot deduce that the function is a dictatorship for m = 2.
Items 3 and 4 are trivial.
Proof of corollary 6.15: We need to show that only one of B,A1, ..., An is not zero. We
begin by showing that w.l.o.g., we may assume that Exg(x) = 0 and therefore B = 0. Indeed,
we introduce a dummy variable y ∈ Sm and define
g′(x, y) = g(xy−1)ρ1(y)
Where for x ∈ Snm we denote xy = (x1y, x2y, ..., xny). Note that Ex,yg′(x, y) = 0 because
Ex,yg
′(x, y) = Ex,yg′(xy, y) = Ex,yg(x)ρ1(y) = Exg(x)Eyρ1(y) = 0
and that IR(g′) = IR(g). Assume the claim is true for g such that Eg = 0, apply it to g′ to
get that either g′(x, y) = Aiρ1(xi) for some i, or g′(x, y) = Bρ1(y). In the first case, it follows
that g(x) = Aiρ
1(xi), and in the second case, it follows that g(x) = B.
We now assume that B = 0. Recall that by claim 6.9, we have g(x)g(x)t = M for some
M 6= 0. On the other hand,
g(x)g(x)t =
∑
ij
Aiρ1(xi)ρ
1t(xj)A
j t
The summand for i, j, translates to(
Aiρ1(xi)ρ
1t(xj)A
j t
)
tu
=
∑
p,q,w,s
ρ1pq(xi)ρ
1
ws(xj)
(
AitpA
j
wuδqs
)
From this expansion we may deduce the Fourier coefficient of ggt at r¯ where r¯ is 1 at i and
j and 0 otherwise:
ĝgttpwuqs(r¯) = (m− 1)2
((
AitpA
j
wuδqs
)
+
(
AjtpA
i
wuδqs
))
(7)
Since ggt is a constant function and the Fourier expansion is unique, we get that ĝgt(r¯)
must be 0. Assume by contradiction that there exist indices tp and wu where Aitp 6= 0, Ajwu 6= 0.
Equation (7) implies that AjtpA
i
wu = −AitpAjwu 6= 0. Therefore, Ajtp 6= 0 and ĝgttptpqq(r¯) ≃
AitpA
j
tp 6= 0
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Proof of corollary 6.16:
The result follows from the following general statement regarding quadratic forms.
Claim: Let K be a finite set. Equip the linear space RK with the L2 metric d(u, v) =
Ex∈K(vx − ux)2. Let M ∈ RK×K be a PSD matrix with spectral gap λ, then for any vector u,
1
|K|uMu
t ≤ λd(u, ker(M))
where ker(M) is the kernel ofM and d(u, ker(M)) is the minimal distance of u from an element
of ker(M) according to d.
Proof: Assume that M has eigenvalues 0 = λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ ... ≤ λ|K|, with corresponding eigen-
vectors v1, ...v|K|, and that s is the first index for which λs > 0. Denote by ûi the projection
of u on vi. Clearly, the distance of u from the kernel of M is
1
|K|
∑|K|
s û
2
i , and the value of the
quadratic form on u is
utMu =
|K|∑
1
û2iλi =
|K|∑
s
û2iλi ≤ λs
 |K|∑
s
û2i


In our case, we have shown in lemma 6.11 that IR(f) = 1|Sm|n+1 tr(GLG
t). When the
elements of G are parsed as vectors instead of (m− 1)× (m− 1) matrices, this translates to
IR(f) =
1
|Sm|n+1G · (I ⊗ L)G
t
Since the spectral gap of 1|Sm|L is O
(
1
m2
)
, so is the spectral gap of 1|Sm|I ⊗ L.
Therefore, if IR(f) ≤ ǫ, then there exists h in the kernel of I⊗L such that ‖G−h‖2 ≤ O(m2)ǫ
(when the elements of G and h are parsed as vectors).

8 Adapted version of [FKN02]
For the sake of self-containedness, we present here the proof from FKN with minor modifications,
needed for the application of the theorem to our setting.
The adapted theorem goes as follows
Theorem 8.1: Let Lin(Snm) be the space of functions of the form
∑
iA
iρ1(xi). Let g : S
n
m →
Rm−1×m−1 be a function such that
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• Eg = 0
• There exists a matrix M such that tr(M) = 1 and ∀x ∈ Snm, g(x)gt(x) =M .
• ‖g − Lin(Snm)‖22 ≤ τ .
then there exists i such that E‖g −Aiρ1(xi)‖22 ≤ O(m5τ).
Before we carry on with the proof of theorem 8.1, we shall show how to apply it to get the
proof of the main theorem:
Proof of theorem 3.10: Let f be an ǫ-IR H social aggregator and let g be g(x) = ρ1(f(x)),
as before. We assume, w.l.o.g., that Eg = 0 (see the proof of 6.15). Since g is consistent, by
claim 6.9 it holds that there exists some matrix M such that for every x, g(x)gt(x) = M . Let
K = tr(M). By corollary 6.14 we have E‖g − Lin(Snm)‖22 ≤ O(m2)ǫ. Therefore, we may apply
theorem 8.1 on 1√
K
g and get that there exists i such that E‖g(x) − Aiρ1(xi)‖22 ≤ O(Km7ǫ).
This is almost what we need, except that we have no guarantee that Aiρ1(xi) is consistent.
However, we show in lemma 8.2 that we can round it to a consistent function without losing
more than a multiplicative constant factor in the distance.
The value of K ranges between 1 (for SCF’s) and m (for SWF’s).

Next we show, as promised, that we can ”round off” our approximation to an approximation
which is consistent without losing too much.
Lemma 8.2: Let g : Snm → R(m−1)×(m−1) be a function such that there exists a matrix M such
that range(g) ⊆ M · range(ρ1). Assume that there exists a function h : Snm → R(m−1)×(m−1),
where h(x) = Aρ1(xi) for some i, and ‖g − h‖2 ≤ δ, then there exists a function h′ = A′ρ1(xi)
such that range(h′) ⊆M · range(ρ1), and ‖g − h′‖2 ≤ 2δ
Proof: Assume that there does not exist A′ ∈M · range(ρ1) such that |A−A′|2 ≤ δ, then
|g − h|2 = |gρ1(x−1i )− hρ1(x−1i )|2 = |gρ1(x−1i )−A|2 ≥ d(M · range(ρ1), A) > δ
which is a contradiction. Therefore, there exists such A′. Define h′ as above h′(x) = A′ρ1(xi),
then
|g − h′|2 ≤ |g − h|2 + |h− h′|2 ≤ 2δ

Proof of theorem 8.1:
Let h be the projection of g on Lin(Snm) and let
q = g − h
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and
r = f · f t −M
Since Eg = 0, there exist Ai’s such that h =
∑
iA
iρ1(xi). We will show that since h ·ht is close
to M , r is typically close to 0, and we will deduce some information on the Ai’s.
In the proof of corollary 6.15, we used the fact that when ǫ = 0, r ≡ 0. For the case when
ǫ is positive, we will try and show that r is close to the 0 function.
Remark 8.3: Note that the entries of r are of the form
rk,l(x) =
C +∑
i,j
Aiρ
1(xi)ρ
1t(xj)A
t
j

k,l
Which makes functions of degree 2. For a formal definition of the degree of a function, see
definition 8.11, to come in subsection 8.1

Remark 8.4: In the following lemma, we use a constant C = 1m
1
2 that is defined in corollary
8.13. We shall call it C from now on so that it will be easier to trace its origin.

Lemma 8.5:
E(r2) ≤ Kǫ = 108(m− 1)4C8ǫ.
Corollary 8.6: There exists i such that ‖Ai‖22 ≥ 1−
(
1 + (m−1)K1−ǫ
)
ǫ = 1−O(m3)ǫ.
Clearly, this corollary implies theorem 8.1.
Proof of corollary:
Because of the orthogonality of h and q, and because E‖g‖22 = 1, E‖h‖22 = 1− ǫ.
Also, because of the orthogonality of the ρ1(xi)’s,
E‖h‖22 =
∑
i
E‖Aiρ1(xi)‖22 =
∑
i
‖Ai‖22
E‖r‖22 ≥
∑
i 6=j
E‖Aiρ1(xi)(Ajρ1(xj))t‖22
Expanding this expression we get:
E‖Aiρ1(xi)(Ajρ1(xj))t‖22 =
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Ex1x2
∑
αµβ1γ1η1β2γ2η2
Aiαβ1ρ
1
β1γ1(xi)ρ
1
η1γ1(xj)A
j
µη1A
i
αβ2ρ
1
β2γ2(xi)ρ
1
η2γ2(xj)A
j
µη2 =
1
(m− 1)2
∑
αµβ1γ1η1β2γ2η2
Aiαβ1δβ1β2δγ1γ2δη1η2δγ1γ2A
j
µη1A
i
αβ2A
j
µη2 =
1
m− 1
∑
αµβη
AiαβA
j
µηA
i
αβA
j
µη =
1
m− 1‖A
i‖22‖Aj‖22
Therefore, if max ‖Ai‖22 = t(
E‖h‖22
)2
= (1− ǫ)2 =
∑
i
(‖Ai‖22)2 + ∑
i,j,i 6=j
‖Ai‖22‖Aj‖22 ≤
(1− ǫ)t+ (m− 1)E‖r‖22 ≤ (1− ǫ)t+ (m− 1)Kǫ
which gives the desired bound on t.

Proof of Lemma 8.5 : The proof consists of two parts: first we will show that typically
r obtains values close to 0. Then we will use a hypercontractive estimate due to Beckner and
Bonami to bound higher moments of r in terms of its second moment showing that its tail
decays fast enough.
Lemma 8.7: Let 0 < α < 1/4 be a constant to be chosen later. Let
p = Prob(|r|22 > α2).
Then
p ≤ 16(m− 1)
2ǫ
α2
.
We defer the proof of this lemma for the moment.
Lemma 8.8:
E(‖r‖22) ≤
(m− 1)2α2
1− 4(m− 1)C4√ǫ/α.
Choosing the optimal value of α (which is 6(m− 1)C4√ǫ) immediately proves Lemma 8.5.
So, to finish the proof we now present the proofs of Lemmas 8.7 and 8.8.
Proof of Lemma 8.7: Recall that q = g−h and that E‖q‖22 = ǫ. Using the fact that ggt =M
yields
r = hht −M = qqt − gqt − qgt
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By the triangle inequality,
‖r(x)‖2 ≤ ‖r(x)‖1 ≤ ‖q(x)qt(x)‖1 + 2‖g(x)qt(x)‖1
We shall prove in claim 8.9 that, for d × d matrices A and B, ‖AB‖1 ≤ d‖A‖2‖B‖2. This
implies
‖r(x)‖2 ≤ (m− 1)(‖q(x)‖22 + 2‖g(x)‖2‖q(x)‖2)
denote t = ‖q(x)‖2. We use that fact that ‖g(x)‖22 = tr
(
g(x)gt(x)
)
= tr(M) = 1
‖r(x)‖2 ≤ (m− 1)(2t + t2)
A simple analysis shows that if t < α/4(m−1), then ‖r(x)‖2 < α. Hence by Markov’s inequality
Pr[‖r(x)‖2 > α] ≤ Pr[‖q(x)‖22 > (α/4(m − 1))2] ≤
(4(m− 1))2ǫ
α2
.

Claim 8.9: The following is the version of Cauchy-Schwartz that we used in the previous proof.
Let A and B be two d dimensional real matrices, then
‖AB‖1 ≤ d‖A‖2‖B‖2
Proof: Let J be the all ones matrix. It is easy to see that for a matrix A, ‖A‖1 =< A, J >. J
can be decomposed to a sum of d permutation matrices P 1, ...P d. Then,
‖AB‖1 =< AB, J >=
d∑
i=1
< AB,P i >=
d∑
i=1
< A,BtP i >≤
d∑
i=1
‖A‖2‖BtP i‖2 = d‖A‖2‖B‖2
When A = B = J , this inequality is tight.

Proof of Lemma 8.8: For convenience of notation let X = E‖r‖22, Xij = E(r2ij) and Yij =
E(r4ij). Also denote pij = P (|rij | ≤ α). In corollary 8.13 we show a Beckner type inequality of
the form:
Yij ≤ C8X2ij
(Notice that, as mentioned in remark 8.3, the entries of r are real functions of degree 2 with
Fourier coefficients only in ρ0 and ρ1, and therefore conform to the requirements of corollary
8.13) Using this we obtain
X =
∑
ij
Xij =
∑
ij
E(r2ij) =
∑
ij
(
(1− pij)E(r2ij |r2ij ≤ α2) + pijE(r2ij |r2ij > α2)
) ≤
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∑
ij
(
(1− pij)α2 + pij
√
E(r4ij |r2ij > α2)
)
≤
∑
ij
(
α2 + pij
√
Yij
pij
)
≤
∑
ij
(
α2 +
√
pijC
4Xij
) ≤
∑
ij
(
α2 +
√
pC4Xij
)
=
(m− 1)2α2 +√pC4X ≤
(m− 1)2α2 + 4(m− 1)
√
ǫ
α
C4X
This yields
X ≤ (m− 1)
2α2
1− 4(m− 1)C4√ǫ/α.

8.1 Beckner’s inequality
This subsection is an adaptation of results from [Wol07] for our case.
8.1.1 Introduction to hypercontractivity
Let Ω be an arbitrary finite set endowed with the measure µ. Assume that µ has at least 2
atoms with non-zero measure. Let S be a linear subspace of the space of all functions from Ω
to R, that includes the constant functions.
Define the operator L to be the orthogonal projection to functions with zero mean L =
Id− Eµ. Define the semigroup Tt = e−tL(t ≥ 0). We shall use the explicit formula
Tt = Eµ + e
−tL = (1− e−t)Eµ + e−tId
Definition 8.10: The semigroup (Tt)t≥ is (p, q)-hypercontractive (for 1 < q < p <∞) over S
if there exists t0 such that for all t ≥ t0 and f ∈ Lq(µ) ∩S
‖Ttf‖Lp(µ) ≤ ‖f‖Lq(µ)
If such a t0 exists and is the least possible, then σp,q(µ,S) = e
−t0 is called the (p, q)-hypercontractive
constant for the measure µ over S.
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Multivariate functions are functions from Ωn to R. The operators L and Tt have multivariate
parallels. Define
Li = Id− Exi µ, T it = e−tL
i
, Tt =
n∏
i=1
T it
From supermultiplicativity of norms, it is easy to observe that for a linear space of func-
tions S as above, σp,q(µ,S) ≤ σp,q(µ,Sn). However, when q < p one can apply Minkowski’s
inequality to get the inequality in the opposite direction, and deduce σp,q(µ,S) = σp,q(µ,S
n).
In our case, S is the space of functions from Sm to R whose Fourier transform is supported on
ρ0 and ρ1,
We now wish to consider the degree of multivariate functions. A monomial of degree d is a
function f such that there exists a set of indices S ⊆ [n] of size d such that for i ∈ S, Lif = f
and for i /∈ S, Lif = 0.
Definition 8.11: A function of degree d is a function in the linear span of all monomials of
degree ≤ d and not in the span of monomials of degree ≤ d− 1.
We will use the following corollary of the hypercontractivity for functions of degree d:
Claim 8.12: If σp,2(µ, (S)) = e
−t0 , then for f ∈ S of degree d,
‖f‖Lp(µ) ≤ ed·t0‖f‖L2(µ)
Proof: Write f = TtT
−1
t f . Therefore,
‖f‖Lp(µ) ≤ ‖T−1t f‖L2(µ)
Now write f = f0 + f1 + ... + fd, where fi is the projection of f onto the monomials of degree
d. Then T−1t f =
∑d
i=1 e
to·ifi. Because the monomials are orthogonal to each other, we have
‖T−1t f‖22 = ‖
d∑
i=1
eto·ifi‖22 =
d∑
i=1
‖eto·ifi‖22 ≤ e2·to·d
d∑
i=1
‖fi‖22 = e2·to·d‖f‖22

In the next subsubsection, we will calculate σ for our needs and arrive at the following lemma:
Corollary 8.13: Let m ≥ e4. Let r be a function r : Snm → R, of degree 2, all of whose Fourier
coefficients are supported on tensors of ρ0 and ρ1. Then we have
‖r‖44 ≤ C8‖r‖42
for C = 1m
1
2 .
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8.1.2 Calculating σ
In this section, we shall calculate σ = σp,q(µ,Sm), where Sm is the space of functions from Sm
to R, whose Fourier transform is supported on ρ0 and ρ1 (and µ is the uniform measure). Our
main result is the following.
Theorem 8.14: There exists some m0 such that for all m > m0,
σ4,2(µ,Sm) ≥ m−
1
2
In the following claim, we present the functions in Sm in a form that will help us in the
analysis:
Claim 8.15: For f ∈ Sm, f(x) = tr(A·P (x)), whereA is the matrix U
(
f̂(0)⊕ (m− 1)f̂ t(1)
)
U t
(See the definition of U in (1)).
Proof: Since f ∈ S, we have f(x) = f̂(0)ρ0(x) + (m− 1)tr
(
f̂ t(1)ρ1(x)
)
. This equals to
f(x) = f̂(0)ρ0(x) + (m− 1)tr
(
f̂ t(1)ρ1(x)
)
= tr
((
f̂(0)⊕ (m− 1)f̂ t(1)
)
· (ρ0(x)⊕ ρ1(x))) =
tr
(
U
(
f̂(0) ⊕ (m− 1)f̂ t(1)
)
U−1 · U (ρ0(x)⊕ ρ1(x))U−1) = tr(A · P (x))

Note that by the definition of U , we have 1A = (A1t)t = 1f̂(0).
We define the following moment-like operators on A:
M1(A) =
∑
i,j
Aij M2(A) =
∑
i,j
A2ij M3(A) =
∑
i,j
A3ij M4(A) =
∑
i,j
A4ij
Mr(A) =
∑
i
∑
j
A2ij
2 Mc(A) =∑
j
(∑
i
A2ij
)2
Mq(A) = tr(AA
tAAt) =
∑
ij
(∑
k
AikAkj
)2
We can express the 2’nd and 4’th norms of functions in Sm using these operators, as shown
in the following lemmas:
Lemma 8.16: Let f be a function in Sm and let f(x) = tr (AP (x)) as in claim 8.15, then
|f |22 = Exf(x)2 =
1
m− 1
(
(m− 2)M2(A) + M
2
1 (A)
m2
)
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Lemma 8.17: Let f be a function in Sm and let f(x) = tr (AP (x)) as in claim 8.15. For
some t > 0, denote σ = e−t. Then
|Ttf |44 = Exf(x)4 = 1(m−1)(m−2)(m−3) (
(
m−12
m2
+O
(
σ4
m3
))
M41 (A)
− O(σ4)M1(A)M3(A)
− O
(
σ4
m
)
M21 (A)M2(A)
+ O
(
σ4m
)
M22 (A)
+ σ4
(
m2 +m
)
M4(A)
− O (σ4m)Mr(A)
− O (σ4m)Mc(A)
+ O
(
σ4
m
)
Mq(A))
The proofs of these lemmas will be given later.
Next, we shall assume that f is normalized so that that |f |22 = 1 and bound the terms
appearing in the expression for |Tf |44 under this constraint:
Claim 8.18: Let f be a function in Sm such that ‖f‖22 = 1, then:
1. |M1(A)| ≤ O(m)
2. M2(A) ≤ m− 1
3. |M3A| ≤ O
(
m
3
2
)
4. M4(A) ≤ O(m2)
5. −Mr(A) ≤ 0,−Mc(A) ≤ 0
6. Mq(A) ≤M22 (A) ≤ O(m2)
Also, the leading coefficient in all of these bounds is 1.
Combining all of this information yields Theorem 8.14:
Proof: Assigning the bounds from claim 8.18 in the expression from lemma 8.17, we see that
all the term except for three are o( 1m ). Addressing the remaining terms we have
‖Ttf‖44 =
m−12
m2 M
4
1 (A) +O
(
σ4m
)
M22 (A) + σ
4m2M4(A)
(m− 1)(m− 2)(m− 3) + o(
1
m
) =
m2(m− 12) +O (σ4m3)+ σ4m4
(m− 1)(m− 2)(m− 3) + o(
1
m
)
When choosing σ = m−
1
2 we get
‖Ttf‖44 =
m2(m− 12) +O (m) +m2
(m− 1)(m− 2)(m− 3) + o(
1
m
)
This expression is asymptotically smaller than 1.
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We shall now present the proofs of the lemmas. We begin with a complicated proof of the
following easy lemma.
Lemma 8.19: Let f be a function in Sm and let f(x) = tr (AP (x)) as in claim 8.15, then
Exf(x) =
M1(A)
m
Proof:
Exf(x) = Extr (AP (x)) = tr (AExP (x))
Remember that P is a representation and is reducible to a copy of ρ0 and ρ1, so
ExP (x) = U
(
Exρ
0(x)⊕ Exρ1(x)
)
U t
Because of Schur’s orthonormality, we have
Exρ
0(x) =< ρ0, 1 >= 1
Exρ
1(x) =< ρ1, 1 >= 0
Therefore, ExP (x) = U (1⊕ 0)U t = Jm . We can now conclude that
Exf(x) = tr
(
A
J
m
)
=
M1(A)
m

We shall use a similar technique to prove lemma 8.16 regarding the 2nd norm of f .
Proof of lemma 8.16:We have
f2(x) = tr (AP (x)) · tr (AP (x)) = tr ((A⊗A) (P (x)⊗ P (x)))
and therefore,
Exf
2(x) = tr ((A⊗A)Ex (P (x)⊗ P (x)))
Denote Q = Ex[P (x) ⊗ P (x)]. We need a closed formula for Q, which we shall obtain by
diagonalizing it. Notice that P ⊗P is a reducible representation. When taking the expectation
Ex[P (x)⊗P (x)], all the copies of ρ0 will become 1, and the copies of other representations will
zero out. The rank of Q is the multiplicity of ρ0 in P ⊗ P , which is:
< χρ0 , χP⊗P >= ExχP⊗P (x) = Ex
∑
i
∑
j
Pii(x)Pjj(x)
 =
∑
i
ExP
2
ii(x) +
∑
i,j,i 6=j
ExPii(x)Pjj(x) = m · 1
m
+m(m− 1) · 1
m(m− 1) = 2
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So Q’s only nonzero eigenvalue is 1 with multiplicity 2. Before computing the eigenvectors of
Q, notice that Q is symmetric, because Qt = ExP
t(x)⊗P t(x) = ExP (x−1)⊗P (x−1) = Q. The
eigenvectors of Q are of size m2. We can guess two eigenvectors of Q. We denote them by u
and v, and list them by their entries, indexed by i, j ∈ [m] (Recall that 1 is the all ones vector,
and 1i is its ith entry, which equals 1):
uij = 1i1j
vij = δij
It is easy to see that for every x, u and v are eigenvectors of P (x) ⊗ P (x). Therefore, these
vectors are also eigenvectors of Q. However, these vectors are not orthogonal. We need to find
linear combinations of them which are orthonormal. In other words, let E be the 2 × (m2)
matrix whose rows are u and v. We wish to find a 2× 2 matrix O of coefficients such that OE
will be an orthonormal matrix, i.e. OE · (OE)t = OEEtOt = I. In that case, we will have
Q = (OE)tOE = EtOtOE. Denote C = EEt, then,
OCOt = I ⇒ O−1 = COt ⇒ COtO = I ⇒ OtO = C−1
Since C = EEt is symmetric and PSD, we may choose O to be O = C−
1
2 and then O is also
symmetric. It is easy to verify that
C = EEt =
(
uut uvt
vut vvt
)
=
(
m2 m
m m
)
and then
OtO = OO = C−1 =
1
(m− 1)m
(
1 −1
−1 m
)
Now
tr ((A⊗A)Q) = tr ((A⊗A)EtOtOE) = tr (E (A⊗A)EtOO) = tr (E (A⊗A)EtC−1)
One can verify that
E (A⊗A)Et =
(
u (A⊗A) ut u (A⊗A) vt
v (A⊗A) ut v (A⊗A) vt
)
=
(
M21 (A)
1
mM
2
1 (A)
1
mM
2
1 (A) M2(A)
)
Finally,
Exf
2(x) =
1
(m− 1)mtr
((
M21 (A)
1
mM
2
1 (A)
1
mM
2
1 (A) M2(A)
)
·
(
1 −1
−1 m
))
=
1
m− 1
(
m− 2
m2
M21 (A) +M2(A)
)

We shall now use the same technique to compute Ef4(x):
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Lemma 8.20: Let f be a function in Sm and let f(x) = tr (AP (x)) as in claim 8.15, then
‖f‖44 = Exf4(x) = 1(m−1)(m−2)(m−3) (
(
m−12
m2
+ o
(
1
m2
))
M41 (A)
− O(1)M1(A)M3(A)
− O ( 1m)M21 (A)M2(A)
+ O (m)M22 (A)
+
(
m2 +m
)
M4(A)
− O (m)Mr(A)
− O (m)Mc(A)
+ O
(
1
m
)
Mq(A))
Proof: We have
f4(x) = tr (AP (x))4 = tr
((
A⊗4
) (
P⊗4(x)
))
and therefore,
Exf
4(x) = tr
((
A⊗4
)
E
(
P⊗4(x)
))
Denote Q = ExP
⊗4(x). We need a closed formula for Q, which we shall obtain by diagonalizing
it. Notice that P⊗4 is a reducible representation. When taking the expectation ExP⊗4(x), all
the copies of ρ0 will become 1, and the copies of other representations will zero out. The rank
of Q is the multiplicity of ρ0 in P⊗4, which is:
< χρ0 , χP⊗4 >= ExχP⊗4(x) = Ex
∑
i,j,k,l
Pii(x)Pjj(x)Pkk(x)Pll(x)
 =
∑
i
ExP
4
ii(x) + 4 ·
∑
i,j,i 6=j
ExP
3
ii(x)Pjj(x) + 6 ·
∑
i,j,k, distinct
ExP
2
ii(x)Pjj(x)Pkk(X)+
3 ·
∑
i,j,i 6=j
ExP
2
ii(x)P
2
jj(x) +
∑
i,j,k,l distinct
ExPii(x)Pjj(x)Pkk(x)Pll(x) =
m
m
+ 4 · m(m− 1)
m(m− 1) + 6
m(m− 1)(m − 2)
m(m− 1)(m − 2)+
3 · m(m− 1)
m(m− 1) + ·
m(m− 1)(m− 2)(m− 3)
m(m− 1)(m− 2)(m− 3) = 15
So Q’s only nonzero eigenvalue is 1 with multiplicity 15. As before, Q is symmetric. Eigen-
vectors of Q are of size m4. We now show 15 eigenvectors of Q, divided into 5 groups. We list
them by their entries, indexed by i, j, k, l ∈ [m]:
E1 = {1i1j1k1l}
E2 = {δi,j1k1l, δi,k1j1l, δi,l1j1k, δj,k1i1l, δj,l1i1k, δk,l1i1j}
E3 = {δi,jδk,l, δi,kδj,l, δi,lδj,k}
E4 = {δi,j,k1l, δi,j,l1k, δi,k,l1j , δj,k,l1i}
E5 = {δi,j,k,l}
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It is easy to see that for every x, These vectors are eigenvectors of P⊗4(x). Therefore, these
vectors are also eigenvectors of Q. However, these vectors are not orthogonal. As before, let
E be the 15 × (m2) matrix whose rows are these vectors. Let C = EEt. Then there exists a
symmetric 15× 15 matrix O such that OE is orthonormal, and OO = C−1. In appendix A, we
give the expression for C and E
(
A⊗4
)
Et. We calculated C−1 using a mathematical software
called Sage. The expression is too large to show it here. Using this result, we computed
Exf
4(x) = tr
(
E
(
A⊗4
)
EtC−1
)
and got the result.

We now wish to apply the result of lemma 8.20 on Ttf to obtain lemma 8.17. We shall use the
following two claims:
Claim 8.21: Let f be a function in Sm and let f(x) = tr (AP (x)) as in claim 8.15, then
Ttf(x) = tr (A
′P (x)), where A′ = σA+ (1− σ)M1(A)
m2
J , and σ = e−t
Proof:
tr
(
A′P (x)
)
= tr
((
σA+ (1− σ)M1(A)
m2
J
)
P (x)
)
=
tr (σAP (x)) + tr
(
(1− σ)M1(A)
m2
JP (x)
)
= σf(x) + (1− σ)Ef = Ttf(x)
where we have used the fact that tr(JP (x)) = m and M1(A) = m · Ef

Claim 8.22: For A as in claim 8.15 and A′ = σA + (1 − σ)M1(A)
m2
J , denote by τ = (1−σ)
m2
. We
have:
1. M1(A
′) =M1(A)
2. M2(A
′) = σ2M2(A) + 2στM21 (A) + q
2M21 (A)
3. M3(A
′) = σ3M3(A) + 3σ2τM1(A)M2(A) + 3στ2M31 + τ
3M31 (A)m
2
4. M4(A
′) = σ4M4(A)+4σ3τM1(A)M3(A)+6σ2τ2M21 (A)M2(A)+4στ
3M41 (A)+τ
4M41 (A)m
2
5. Mr(A
′) = σ4Mr(A) + 4σ3τM21 (A)M2(A)
1
m + 2σ
2τ2M21 (A)M2(A)m + 4σ
2τ2M41 (A)
1
m +
4στ3M41 (A)m+ τ
4M41 (A)m
3
6. Mc(A
′) = σ4Mc(A) + 4σ3τM21 (A)M2(A)
1
m + 2σ
2τ2M21 (A)M2(A)m + 4σ
2τ2M41 (A)
1
m +
4στ3M41 (A)m+ τ
4M41 (A)m
3
7. Mq(A
′) = σ4Mq(A) + 4σ3τM41 (A)
1
m2
+ 6σ2τ2M41 (A) + 4στ
3M41 (A)m
2 + τ4M41 (A)m
4
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Proof: Since all the cases in this lemma are straightforward, we make do with demonstrating
the proof of item number 4, and do not include the tedious, but simple calculations of the other
cases. For item 4 we have:
M4(A
′) =
∑
i1j1k1l1i2j2k2l2
δi1j1k1l1
(
A′
)⊗4
(i1j1k1l1)(i2j2k2l2)
δi2j2k2l2 =
∑
i1j1k1l1i2j2k2l2
δi1j1k1l1 (σA+ τM1(A)J)
⊗4
(i1j1k1l1)(i2j2k2l2)
δi2j2k2l2
The above summation can be expanded into six types of summands:
• 1 summand of the form
σ4
∑
i1j1k1l1i2j2k2l2
δi1j1k1l1 (A)
⊗4
(i1j1k1l1)(i2j2k2l2)
δi2j2k2l2 = σ
4M4(A)
• 4 summands of the form
σ3τM1(A)
∑
i1j1k1l1i2j2k2l2
δi1j1k1l1
(
A⊗3 ⊗ J)
(i1j1k1l1)(i2j2k2l2)
δi2j2k2l2 = σ
3τM1(A)M3(A)
• 4 summands of the form
σ2τ2M21 (A)
∑
i1j1k1l1i2j2k2l2
δi1j1k1l1
(
A⊗2 ⊗ J⊗2)
(i1j1k1l1)(i2j2k2l2)
δi2j2k2l2 =
σ2τ2M21 (A)M2(A)
• 2 summands of the form
σ2τ2M21 (A)
∑
i1j1k1l1i2j2k2l2
δi1j1k1l1 (A⊗ J ⊗A⊗ J)(i1j1k1l1)(i2j2k2l2) δi2j2k2l2 =
σ2τ2M21 (A)M2(A)
• 4 summands of the form
στ3M31 (A)
∑
i1j1k1l1i2j2k2l2
δi1j1k1l1
(
A⊗ J⊗3)
(i1j1k1l1)(i2j2k2l2)
δi2j2k2l2 =
στ3M31 (A)M1(A) = στ
3M41 (A)
• 1 summand of the form
τ4M41 (A)
∑
i1j1k1l1i2j2k2l2
δi1j1k1l1
(
J⊗4
)
(i1j1k1l1)(i2j2k2l2)
δi2j2k2l2 = τ
4M41 (A)m
2

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Proof of lemma 8.17: This lemma is simply an application of lemma 8.20 to Ttf and an
assignment of the values of the moments of A′ given in claim 8.22. Since there are many terms
involved in the assignment, we used Sage to get to the actual expression here as well.

Proof of claim 8.18:
1. |M1(A)| ≤ O(m):
Ef2(x) = 1 =
1
m− 1
(
M2(A) + (m− 1)M
2
1 (A)
m2
)
≥ 1
m− 1
(
(m− 1)M
2
1 (A)
m2
)
⇒
|M1(A)| ≤ O(m)
2. M2(A) ≤ m− 1:
Ef2(x) = 1 =
1
m− 1
(
M2(A) + (m− 1)M
2
1 (A)
m2
)
≥ 1
m− 1 (M2(A))⇒
M2(A) ≤ m− 1
3. |M3A| ≤ O
(
m
3
2
)
: Let a = Ei,jAij , B = A − aJ , b2 = EB2i,j. We take b to be positive.
The items above imply that |a| ≤ O( 1m ) and that b ≤
√
1
m .∑
i,j
A3i,j =
∑
i,j
(a+Bi,j)
3 = m2a3 + 3aM2(B) + 3a
2M1(B) +M3(B) =
m2a3 + 3am2b2 +M3(B)
Given that the 2nd moment ofB ism2b2, Jensen’s inequality implies that |M3(B)| ≤ m3b3.
Applying the bounds on a and b yields the result.
4. M4(A) ≤ O(m2): Let a,B and b be as in the previous item.∑
i,j
A4i,j =
∑
i,j
(a+Bi,j)
4 = m2a4 + 4aM3(B) + 6a
2M2(B) + 4a
3M1(B) +M4(B) =
m2a4 + 4aM3(B) + 6a
2m2b2 +M4(B)
Again, given that the 3rd moment of B ism2b2, Jensen’s inequality implies that |M3(B)| ≤
m3b3 and |M4(B)| ≤ m4b4. Applying the bounds on a and b yields the result.
5. −Mr(A) ≤ 0,−Mc(A) ≤ 0: By definition, these operators are nonnegative.
6. Mq(A) ≤ M22 (A) ≤ O(m2): Notice that AAt is a symmetric PSD matrix. Let λ be the
vector of eigenvalues of AAt (which are all nonnegative). We have M2(A) = tr(AA
t) =∑
i λi and Mq(A) = tr
(
AAtAAt
)
=
∑
i λ
2
i . Therefore, Mq =
∑
i λ
2
i ≤ (
∑
i λi)
2 =M22

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9 Strategy Proofness
Before discussing further work we wish to briefly discuss the notion of IR, that arises naturally
when considering the spectrum of outcomes between SCF’s and SWF’s. The connection between
IR and IIA is easy to understand, despite the fact that neither of these constraints implies the
other. In this section we wish to touch upon the other end of the spectrum and discuss the
connection between IR and strategy proofness.
We present a definition of strategy proofness that is closely related to IR. We will show
how our robust impossibility theorem for IR implies a robust impossibility theorem for this
definition of strategy proofness. In this sense, our technique provides a single proof for the
analogues of both Arrow’s theorem (SWF’s with independence) and Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s
theorem (SCF with strategy proofness).
The definition we give here is based on the definition of Dietrich and List [DL07] for strategy
proofness on judgment aggregation, which is a general framework that includes the setting of
Arrow’s theorem. In this framework, there is a permissible opinion space X ⊆ [k]m and we
are interested in social aggregators of the form f : Xn → X. A widely studied topic was the
characterization of spaces X for which independence implies dictatorship, as in Arrow’s theorem
and our setting. This characterization can be found in [NP10] and [DH10a] for k = 2 and in
[DH10b] for general k. In [DL07], a general definition of strategy proofness was given for this
framework was for k = 2, and was connected to independence. The definition we present here
follows from an extension of the definition in [DL07] for any k, which also deals with the case
where the output space of the function is different than the input space.
Let H be a fixing subgroup of Sm. Let f be f : S
n
m → Sm/H. We assume that for any
alternative j ∈ [m], given the ranking of j by a certain voter, we are able to rank the voter’s
preference over all possible j-profiles of the outcome.
Formally, define the set Qj to be the set of all possible j-profiles of a coset of H, Qj =
{K−1(j)}K∈Sm/H . For every alternative j ∈ [m] and ranking r ∈ [m], we assume that there
exists some full transitive order relation on Qj. We denote it by <r,j. It is natural to assume
that for a specific ranking of the alternatives x, the top of the order <x−1(j),j will be the j-profile
of the coset that includes x. However, we do not demand that.
A manipulation is a situation where for any alternative j, a voter i ∈ [n] can report a false
opinion and get better j-profile of the outcome, according to his preference order <x−1i (j),j
.
Formally, a manipulation exists when the following holds:
∃j, i, x−i, xi, yif−1(x−i, xi)(j) <x−1
i
,j f
−1(x−i, yi)(j)
The manipulation power of a voter i is the rate of manipulations he can make:
Mi(f) =
∑
j
Ex−i,xi,yi
(
f−1(x−i, xi)(j) <x−1i ,j f
−1(x−i, yi)(j)
)
The total manipulation power of f is M(f) =
∑
iMi(f). f will be called strategy-proof if
M(f) = 0. The rationale behind this definition is that as the designers of a social aggregation
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mechanism, we do not wish to specify up front for which alternatives j there might be a voter i
who wishes to manipulate, and therefore we wish to be immune against all such manipulations.
We shall now connect IR(f) to M(f). Denote c = maxK1,K2∈Sm/H
∥∥∥nK1−nK2|H| ∥∥∥22 (Recall nK
is the characteristic vector of a multiset K). For example, when H is the group of permutations
fixing {1}, as in SCFs, we have c = ‖(1, 0, ...0) − (0, 1m−1 , ..., 1m−1 )‖22 = mm−1 .
Claim 9.1: cM(f) ≥ IR(f)
Proof: Examine all pairs of profiles (x−i, xi) and (x−i, yi), such that x−1i (j) = y
−1
i (j) and
f(x−i, xi)−1(j) 6= f(x−i, yi)−1(j). By definition, those pairs of inputs contribute at most c to
IR(f).
Denote r = x−1i (j) = y
−1
i (j), Kx = f(x
−i, xi)−1(j), Ky = f(x−i, yi)−1(j). Since Kx 6= Ky,
we must have either Kx <r,j Ky or Ky <r,j Kx. Therefore, this pair of inputs contribute 1 to
M(f).

As a corollary of this claim and theorem 3.10, we have
Corollary 9.2: Let H ⊆ Sm be a fixing subgroup of Sm. For m ≥ 3, an H-social aggregator
f for which M(f) ≤ ǫ is OH(poly(m)ǫ) close to a function that is either a constant function
or dictatorial of the following form: there exists a voter i and a constant permutation y of the
rankings such that f(x) = y ◦ xi.
10 Further Work
We have began to apply the techniques of this paper to Arrow’s theorem (with relaxed indepen-
dence constraint) and to Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s theorem, with partial success. GS seems to
offer many more new challenges for this scheme, as the Laplacian is not PSD and not Symmetric.
It is also interesting to see how this technique applies to the generalized problem of judgment
aggregation (see its definition in section 9). There are known combinatorial characterization
results of functions satisfying independence in this setting, depending on the opinion space X,
and our technique may be useful in finding robust versions of these theorems, wherever possible.
Another direction is to study how our proof could be modified for groups other than Sm.
As mentioned earlier, our result can be interpreted as a 2 query dictatorship tester, for
functions Snm → Sm/H. It is interesting to see whether this has any computational implications.
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A Appendix: matrices for the proof of lemma 8.20
C = EEt =

m4 m3 m3 m3 m3 m3 m3 m2 m2 m2 m2 m2 m2 m2 m1
m3 m3 m2 m2 m2 m2 m2 m2 m1 m1 m2 m2 m1 m1 m1
m3 m2 m3 m2 m2 m2 m2 m1 m2 m1 m2 m1 m2 m1 m1
m3 m2 m2 m3 m2 m2 m2 m1 m1 m2 m1 m2 m2 m1 m1
m3 m2 m2 m2 m3 m2 m2 m1 m1 m2 m2 m1 m1 m2 m1
m3 m2 m2 m2 m2 m3 m2 m1 m2 m1 m1 m2 m1 m2 m1
m3 m2 m2 m2 m2 m2 m3 m2 m1 m1 m1 m1 m2 m2 m1
m2 m2 m1 m1 m1 m1 m2 m2 m1 m1 m1 m1 m1 m1 m1
m2 m1 m2 m1 m1 m2 m1 m1 m2 m1 m1 m1 m1 m1 m1
m2 m1 m1 m2 m2 m1 m1 m1 m1 m2 m1 m1 m1 m1 m1
m2 m2 m2 m1 m2 m1 m1 m1 m1 m1 m2 m1 m1 m1 m1
m2 m2 m1 m2 m1 m2 m1 m1 m1 m1 m1 m2 m1 m1 m1
m2 m1 m2 m2 m1 m1 m2 m1 m1 m1 m1 m1 m2 m1 m1
m2 m1 m1 m1 m2 m2 m2 m1 m1 m1 m1 m1 m1 m2 m1
m1 m1 m1 m1 m1 m1 m1 m1 m1 m1 m1 m1 m1 m1 m1

We compute C−1 using an algebraic software called Sage. The expressions are too large to
write here. Since all the entries of C are monomials in m, the determinant of C is a polynomial
of a bounded degree in m, and therefore C is regular for all but a finite number of values of m.
Actually, using Sage, we find the determinant of C to be m15(m− 1)14(m − 2)7(m − 3), so C
is singular only for m = 0, 1, 2, 3.
For the expression for E
(
A⊗4
)
E we abuse the notation and use the sets Ei as matrices
whose rows are the elements of Ei. We have:
E
(
A⊗4
)
E =
 E1
(
A⊗4
)
Et1 E1
(
A⊗4
)
Et2 . . . E1
(
A⊗4
)
Et5
...
...
. . .
...
E5
(
A⊗4
)
Et1 E5
(
A⊗4
)
Et2 . . . E5
(
A⊗4
)
Et5

42
Where:
E1
(
A⊗4
)
Et1 =
(
M41
)
E1
(
A⊗4
)
Et2 =
1
m
(
M41 M
4
1 M
4
1 M
4
1 M
4
1 M
4
1
)
E1
(
A⊗4
)
Et3 = m
(
M41 M
4
1 M
4
1
)
E1
(
A⊗4
)
Et4 = m
(
M41 M
4
1 M
4
1 M
4
1
)
E1
(
A⊗4
)
Et5 =
1
m2
(
M41
)
E2
(
A⊗4
)
Et2 =
1
m2

M21M2 M
4
1m M
4
1m M
4
1m M
4
1m M
4
1m
M41m M
2
1M2 M
4
1m M
4
1m M
4
1m M
4
1m
M41m M
4
1m M
2
1M2 M
4
1m M
4
1m M
4
1m
M41m M
4
1m M
4
1m M
2
1M2 M
4
1m M
4
1m
M41m M
4
1m M
4
1m M
4
1m M
2
1M2 M
4
1m
M41m M
4
1m M
4
1m M
4
1m M
4
1m M
2
1M2

E2
(
A⊗4
)
Et3 =
1
m

M21M2 M
4
1
1
m2
M41
1
m2
M41
1
m2 M
2
1M2 M
4
1
1
m2
M41
1
m2 M
4
1
1
m2 M
2
1M2
M41
1
m2 M
4
1
1
m2 M
2
1M2
M41
1
m2
M21M2 M
4
1
1
m2
M21M2 M
4
1
1
m2
M41
1
m2

E2
(
A⊗4
)
Et4 =
1
m

M21M2 M
2
1M2 M
4
1
1
m2 M
4
1
1
m2
M21M2 M
4
1
1
m2 M
2
1M2 M
4
1
1
m2
M41
1
m2 M
2
1M2 M
2
1M2 M
4
1
1
m2
M21M2 M
4
1
1
m2
M41
1
m2
M21M2
M41
1
m2
M21M2 M
4
1
1
m2
M21M2
M41
1
m2
M41
1
m2
M21M2 M
2
1M2

E2
(
A⊗4
)
Et5 =
1
m2

M21M2
x21M2
x21M2
x21M2

E3
(
A⊗4
)
Et3 =
 M22 Mq MqMq M22 Mq
Mq Mq M
2
2

E3
(
A⊗4
)
Et4 =
1
m2
 M21M2 M21M2 M21M2 M21M2M21M2 M21M2 M21M2 M21M2
M21M2 M
2
1M2 M
2
1M2 M
2
1M2

E3
(
A⊗4
)
Et5 =
 McMc
Mc

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E4
(
A⊗4
)
Et4 =
1
m2

M1M3
1
m M
2
1M2 M
2
1M2 M
2
1M2
M21M2 M1M3
1
m M
2
1M2 M
2
1M2
M21M2 M
2
1M2 M1M3
1
m M
2
1M2
M21M2 M
2
1M2 M
2
1M2 M1M3
1
m

E4
(
A⊗4
)
Et5 =
1
m

M1M3
M1M3
M1M3
M1M3

E5
(
A⊗4
)
Et3 =
(
Mc Mc Mc
)
E5
(
A⊗4
)
Et5 =
(
M4
)
For the blocks that weren’t explicitly mentioned, Ei
(
A⊗4
)
Etj =
(
Ei
(
A⊗4
)
Etj
)t
.
We add here the protocol of the Sage code we used, for completeness:
R.<m,a1,a13,a112,a22,a4,r22,c22,q,sig>=QQ[]
C=matrix(R,15,15,
[
m^4, m^3,m^3,m^3,m^3,m^3,m^3, m^2,m^2,m^2, m^2,m^2,m^2,m^2, m^1,
m^3, m^3,m^2,m^2,m^2,m^2,m^2, m^2,m^1,m^1, m^2,m^2,m^1,m^1, m^1,
m^3, m^2,m^3,m^2,m^2,m^2,m^2, m^1,m^2,m^1, m^2,m^1,m^2,m^1, m^1,
m^3, m^2,m^2,m^3,m^2,m^2,m^2, m^1,m^1,m^2, m^1,m^2,m^2,m^1, m^1,
m^3, m^2,m^2,m^2,m^3,m^2,m^2, m^1,m^1,m^2, m^2,m^1,m^1,m^2, m^1,
m^3, m^2,m^2,m^2,m^2,m^3,m^2, m^1,m^2,m^1, m^1,m^2,m^1,m^2, m^1,
m^3, m^2,m^2,m^2,m^2,m^2,m^3, m^2,m^1,m^1, m^1,m^1,m^2,m^2, m^1,
m^2, m^2,m^1,m^1,m^1,m^1,m^2, m^2,m^1,m^1, m^1,m^1,m^1,m^1, m^1,
m^2, m^1,m^2,m^1,m^1,m^2,m^1, m^1,m^2,m^1, m^1,m^1,m^1,m^1, m^1,
m^2, m^1,m^1,m^2,m^2,m^1,m^1, m^1,m^1,m^2, m^1,m^1,m^1,m^1, m^1,
m^2, m^2,m^2,m^1,m^2,m^1,m^1, m^1,m^1,m^1, m^2,m^1,m^1,m^1, m^1,
m^2, m^2,m^1,m^2,m^1,m^2,m^1, m^1,m^1,m^1, m^1,m^2,m^1,m^1, m^1,
m^2, m^1,m^2,m^2,m^1,m^1,m^2, m^1,m^1,m^1, m^1,m^1,m^2,m^1, m^1,
m^2, m^1,m^1,m^1,m^2,m^2,m^2, m^1,m^1,m^1, m^1,m^1,m^1,m^2, m^1,
m^1, m^1,m^1,m^1,m^1,m^1,m^1, m^1,m^1,m^1, m^1,m^1,m^1,m^1, m^1
])
t=(1-sig)/m^2
44
# the variables a1,a13,a112,a22,a4,r22,c22,q represent, repectively
M41 (A),M1(A)M3(A),M
2
1 (A)M2(A),M
2
2 (A),M4(A),Mr(A),Mc(A),Mq(A)
# the variables a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h represent, repectively
M41 (A
′),M1(A′)M3(A′),M21 (A
′)M2(A′),M22 (A
′),M4(A′),Mr(A′),Mc(A′),Mq(A′)
a=a1
b=sig^3*a13 + 3*sig*(1-sig)^2*a1/m^4 + 3*sig^2*(1-sig)*a112/m^2 + t^3*a1*m^2
c=sig^2*a112 + (2*sig*t+t^2)*a1
d=sig^4*a22 + 2*(2*sig*t+t^2)*sig^2*a112 + (2*sig*t+t^2)^2*a1
e=sig^4*a4 + 4*sig*t^3*a1 + 6*sig^2*t^2*a112 + 4*sig^3*t*a13 + t^4*a1*m^2
f=sig^4*r22 + 4*sig^3*t*a112/m + sig^2*t^2*(2*a112*m + 4*a1/m) + 4*sig*t^3*a1*m
+ t^4*a1*m^3
g=sig^4*c22 + 4*sig^3*t*a112/m + sig^2*t^2*(2*a112*m + 4*a1/m) + 4*sig*t^3*a1*m
+ t^4*a1*m^3
h=sig^4*q + 4*sig^3*t*a1/m^2 + 6*sig^2*t^2*a1 + 4*sig*t^3*a1*m^2 + t^4*a1*m^4
#Sage can not work with matrices with rational entries. Therefore, we multiply
all the variables by m^10 and the matrix E by m^3.
a=a*m^10; b=b*m^10; c=c*m^10; d=d*m^10; e=e*m^10; f=f*m^10; g=g*m^10; h=h*m^10;
E=matrix(R,15,15,
[
a*m^3, a*m^2,a*m^2,a*m^2,a*m^2,a*m^2,a*m^2, a*m^1,a*m^1,a*m^1, a*m^1,a*m^1,a*m^1,
a*m^1, a,
a*m^2, c,a*m,a*m,a*m,a*m,a*m, c*m^2,a,a, c*m^2,c*m^2,a,a, c*m,
a*m^2, a*m,c,a*m,a*m,a*m,a*m, a,c*m^2,a, c*m^2,a,c*m^2,a, c*m,
a*m^2, a*m,a*m,c,a*m,a*m,a*m, a,a,c*m^2, a,c*m^2,c*m^2,a, c*m,
a*m^2, a*m,a*m,a*m,c,a*m,a*m, a,a,c*m^2, c*m^2,a,a,c*m^2, c*m,
a*m^2, a*m,a*m,a*m,a*m,c,a*m, a,c*m^2,a, a,c*m^2,a,c*m^2, c*m,
a*m^2, a*m,a*m,a*m,a*m,a*m,c, c*m^2,a,a, a,a,c*m^2,c*m^2, c*m,
a*m^1, c*m^2,a,a,a,a,c*m^2, d*m^3,h*m^3,h*m^3, c*m,c*m,c*m,c*m, f*m^3,
a*m^1, a,c*m^2,a,a,c*m^2,a, h*m^3,d*m^3,h*m^3, c*m,c*m,c*m,c*m, f*m^3,
a*m^1, a,a,c*m^2,c*m^2,a,a, h*m^3,h*m^3,d*m^3, c*m,c*m,c*m,c*m, f*m^3,
a*m^1, c*m^2,c*m^2,a,c*m^2,a,a, c*m,c*m,c*m, b,c*m,c*m,c*m, b*m^2,
a*m^1, c*m^2,a,c*m^2,a,c*m^2,a, c*m,c*m,c*m, c*m,b,c*m,c*m, b*m^2,
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a*m^1, a,c*m^2,c*m^2,a,a,c*m^2, c*m,c*m,c*m, c*m,c*m,b,c*m, b*m^2,
a*m^1, a,a,a,c*m^2,c*m^2,c*m^2, c*m,c*m,c*m, c*m,c*m,c*m,b, b*m^2,
a, c*m,c*m,c*m,c*m,c*m,c*m, g*m^3,g*m^3,g*m^3, b*m^2,b*m^2,b*m^2,b*m^2, e*m^3
])
l=(C.inverse()*E).trace()/m^13
l(m,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,sig)
l(m,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,sig)
l(m,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,sig)
l(m,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,sig)
l(m,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,sig)
l(m,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,sig)
l(m,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,sig)
l(m,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,sig)
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